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Title 
 Contesting Urban Citizenship: The Urban Poor’s Strategies of State Engagement 
in Chennai, India 
 
 
Abstract 
Existing accounts of how the urban poor in the global south engage with the state fall 
short on two fronts. Firstly, the literature lacks an overarching framework articulating 
the urban poor’s strategies for engaging the state. Secondly, these accounts typically 
capture singular instances of state engagement pursued by the urban poor and theorise 
on that basis. Using Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between civil and political society as 
our theoretical point of departure, we draw on ethnographic evidence from Chennai’s 
informal settlements to demonstrate how and when the urban poor deploy different 
strategies of state engagement to advance their claims to urban citizenship. We do this 
by proposing a typology that relates the seemingly distinct strategies of claims making 
for urban citizenship to each other, and identifying a trajectory of change for strategies 
deployed in the Indian metropolis of Chennai.   
 
Introduction 
 Urban citizenship, or the lack thereof, has a material character manifested in 
access to land, infrastructure, and basic services (Anand 2012, Benjamin 2008, Kooy and 
Bakker 2008, McFarlane and Rutherford 2008, Das 2011, Harvey 2008). Objects such as 
electricity meters, water connections, toilets, and documents certifying property 
ownership ‘become material embodiments of the right to dwelling’ (Das 2011: 327). 
This competition over scarce resources divides rich and poor. While the urban poor 
claim urban citizenship through access to land tenure and basic services, the upper and 
middle-income residents of the city seek to prevent this to extend their claim to spaces 
of lesiure, cleanliness, and order (Ghertner 2012). These attempts often threaten the 
existence of the urban poor, with slum eviction drives often the result (Fernandez 2004, 
Fernandez and Heller 2006).  
 The urban poor wage their claims to space and resources from a disadvantaged 
position as ‘citizens without a city’ (Appadurai, 2001: 27), viewed by state authorities as 
illegal squatters. The disadvantaged position from which the urban poor seek to attain 
urban citizenship is captured succinctly in Partha Chatterjee’s (2004) theoretical 
distinction between civil and political society. Criticizing the permissiveness with which 
scholars have expanded the idea of civil society, Chatterjee characterizes civil society as 
bourgeois, consisting of urban elites with settled claims on property, and by extension, 
urban citizenship. The urban poor instead occupy what Chatterjee terms ‘political 
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society’: ‘a site of negotiation and contestation opened up by the activities of 
governmental agencies aimed at population groups’, who are ‘only tenuously rights 
bearing citizens’ and therefore a ‘population’ for the state to govern (Chatterjee 2004: 
74, 38). Without settled claims on property, the urban poor are forced to operate in the 
realm of paralegality, an ambiguous sphere outside the bounds of formal codified rules 
and procedures.  
 As with all powerful paradigms, Chatterjee’s theoretical distinction between civil 
and political society has been critiqued for its bluntness. One major critique of 
Chatterjee is to highlight the pervasiveness of informality in the global South’s cities 
(Baviskar and Sundar 2008, Roy 2009), with the urban middle classes also engaged in 
informal practices such as exploiting legal loopholes and subverting the law to access 
land and basic services (Ranganathan 2014b, Truelove and Mawdsley 2011, Naqvi 
forthcoming).   
 Indeed, informal practices are used as much by the rich as the poor.  Yet, 
Chatterjee’s theoretical formulation remains relevant for approximating the tenuous 
terrain upon and the purpose with which the urban poor operate to seek their ends. 
Urban elites, when using informal or paralegal means, do so from a stronger position of 
having attained urban citizenship through settled claims on property. The urban poor, 
however, negotiate with the state from a position of disadvantage, seeking to secure 
urban citizenship that they do not already have. This also affects the ease with which the 
urban poor can access the state and its functionaries. While urban elites are engaged by 
authorities as key stakeholders in the making of new ‘world class’ cities through public 
consultation exercises, such avenues are often unavailable to the urban poor (Ellis 2012, 
Raman 2013, Weinstein 2014). Lacking access to ‘invited’ spaces of participation made 
available by the state, the urban poor often have to resort to creating ‘invented’ spaces 
of participation (Miraftab 2006, Cornwall 2002) to engage the state to seek concessions 
and extend their claims to urban citizenship. 
 This paper examines how the urban poor operate in the realm of Chatterjee’s 
political society by deploying strategies of state engagement to seek concessions and 
extend their claims to urban citizenship. It seeks to extend the understanding of 
Chatterjee’s political society as a strategic space within which the urban poor deploy 
multiple strategies of state engagement in response to context, temporality, and access 
to material and symbolic resources. The existing literature on urban contestations 
presents multiple strategies of state engagement, but usually presents one such strategy 
at a time. We develop a typology to better analyse these strategies’ key characteristics, 
their relationship to one another, and when they are deployed.  
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Strategies of Engagement 
 Chatterjee does not systematically lay out the methods used by the urban poor 
to claim urban citizenship in The Politics of The Governed. Yet, in his primary example, 
Chatterjee describes the residents of Gobindapur Railway Colony 1 (an informal 
settlement in Calcutta) as having transitioned from protesting against attempted 
evictions to collectively negotiating electricity connections through a local residential 
welfare association. Although Chatterjee does not elaborate the conditions that gave rise 
to these different forms of engagement and their underlying characteristics, his example 
indicates how the forms of state engagement used by the urban poor evolve over time.  
 The existing literature on state engagement practiced by the urban poor reveals 
a variety of methods exploiting the pluralistic, multi-faceted, and fissured state 
apparatus (Ranganathan 2014a). Protests and other forms of mass-agitations often 
associated with the urban poor (Harriss 2006) feature as the most prominent form of 
state engagement, usually as options of last resort. Benjamin’s (2008) ‘occupancy 
urbanism’, Bayat’s (1997b) ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’, and Rao’s (2013) 
‘tolerated encroachment’ all show how the urban poor exploit bureaucratic slippages 
and connections in a more subtle form of state engagement. Similarly, Das (2011) and 
Jha et al. (2007) elaborate how local politicians serve as alternative democratic conduits 
for the urban poor to seek concessions from the state. On occasion, the urban poor 
eschew the politics of cooperation for more direct means of confrontation challenging 
the existing regime of citizenship. For instance, Appadurai (2001) and Kumar et al. 
(2014)  demonstrate how the urban poor challenge governmentality from below 
through legitimation practices such as self-enumeration surveys, and the drafting of 
alternative maps articulating customary rights to the commons. Further, the use of 
middle class forms of associationalism and symbolism are sometimes appropriated by 
the urban poor when engaging the state to realise ends that are ‘framed less as political 
demands than as rights activated by authorized and documented allotments of urban 
“property”’ (Coelho and Venkat, 2009: 359).  
 The examples above, mainly drawn from India, articulate the various 
approaches the urban poor use in trying to attain urban citizenship but leave 
unanswered questions of why and when the urban poor use particular strategies of 
state engagement. Answering these questions requires a framework that identifies 
similarities and differences between the various strategies by analysing their key 
characteristics. Further, understanding how the use of these strategies form part of a 
strategic calculus responsive to temporality and context requires moving beyond one-
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off representations of such strategies. We present a typology capturing the various 
strategies of state engagement used by the urban poor in which strategies take one of 
four forms: informal-antagonistic; informal-transactional; formal-antagonistic; or 
formal-transactional.  
 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
 The first dimension of the typology distinguishes strategies of engagement as 
being formal or informal. Here, formality and informality are analysed as practices 
rather than territorial or organizational categorizations. This does not render the latter 
two categories irrelevant, for they affect the extent to which particular types of 
strategies can be deployed, especially for the urban poor. Thus, for instance, the urban 
poor, based on their categorization as unlawful squatters, still can access formal 
strategies of engagement, albeit with some difficulty. The analysis of informality and 
formality as forms of practice also acknowledges that formality and informality are not 
benign categorizations but instead reflections of dominant interests, with flagrant 
violations of law by urban elites downplayed and the transgressions of the urban poor 
amplified (Roy 2009, Truelove and Mawdsley 2011, Ranganathan 2014b).  
 In our formulation, formal practices refer to one of two things. The first 
definition refers to practices conforming to existing bureaucratic logics. This refers to 
bureaucratic practices defined by the state through law or policy as appropriate means 
by which to engage state institutions and actors. These include the filing of a Right to 
Information request (RTI), the filing of a court case, the writing of official letters and 
petitions, the paying of utility charges and the use of methods that are deemed by the 
state to be legitimate means of knowledge production and categorization (e.g. the 
conduct of surveys or drafting of maps using methods that would be accepted by the 
state).  
 The second refers to the use of practices that are deemed visually, socially, and 
spatially legitimate in the eyes of the state. Such practices include attempts to engage 
the state through organizational forms such as Residential Welfare Associations (RWAs) 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the use of symbolic practices within 
such organizations (e.g. the affixing of organizational seals on letters sent to state 
agencies). While RWAs and NGOs are forms of civil society organizations, the use of 
these platforms and their symbols by urban poor groups constitutes a form of practice 
that seeks to elicit notions of stateliness and formality (Lund 2006) Conversely, informal 
practices are a residual category of practices that do not conform to existing 
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bureaucratic logics or that attempt to engage the state via organizational forms and 
platforms viewed as illegitimate by the state.  
 Our definition of formality and informality places significant authority in the 
hands of the state to define what is formal and informal. This is intentional, for existing 
examples in India reveal the state’s manipulation of the categories of formal and 
informal as tools of governmentality to advance its developmental agendas (Bjo rkman 
2014, Ghertner 2008, Roy 2009). Formality and informality remain negotiable practices 
that can occasionally be challenged from below (Appadurai 2001). Yet, the balance of 
power tilts largely towards the state, whose institutions and concomitant practices are 
aimed at maintaining an existing social and political order (Mitchell 1991).  
 The second dimension of our framework views practices as being either 
antagonistic or transactional. Antagonistic practices are those that overtly challenge the 
state’s authority and the existing status quo. Such measures include, for instance, the 
holding of protests, filing of court cases, and the usage of surveys and maps that 
challenge the state’s existing classifications and enumerations. Transactional practices 
on the other hand, do not overtly challenge the state’s authority and the existing status 
quo. The status quo is instead amended through collaborative relationships and 
incremental, calculated steps negotiated with the state and its representatives. Such 
measures include for instance, seeking concessions from politicians or state bureaucrats 
and engaging in collaborative discussions through organizations such as NGOs and 
RWAs. The following section will further elaborate on the four types of strategies 
contained in the framework using ethnographic evidence.  
 
An ethnography of forms of state engagement 
  We draw primarily on ethnographic evidence from two informal settlements in 
the South Indian city of Chennai to outline and elaborate upon the dimensions of the 
proposed framework. The evidence presented in this section draws on direct 
observations and semi-structured interviews conducted in these two informal 
settlements, as well as interviews with elected municipal government representatives2, 
local political actors and community leaders/representatives, representatives of Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs), and current and retired government officials. In 
total, 70 individuals were interviewed. The ethnographic methodology used in this 
                                                        
2 We actually interviewed the husbands of elected municipal representatives 
who performed the responsibilities of the elected municipal councilor. Their 
wives had stood on their behalf due to electoral quotas that designated certain 
seats for women.  
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study is the extended case method (Burawoy 1998). Our inquiry into the strategies of 
state engagement in Chennai is based on and seeks to reconstruct existing theories – 
especially those developed with an empirical foundation in urban India.  
 Drawing on five months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2014 and 
2015, we identify the use of strategies of engagement belonging to each of the categories 
presented in our framework. The informal settlements that formed our field sites, 
Anjaneyar Nagar and Service Colony, 3 are located in central Chennai, on one bank of the 
Buckingham canal, an inland waterway cutting through much of the city. The opposite 
bank of the canal, previously housing other informal settlements, holds the tracks of the 
Chennai Metropolitan Railway system. Having existed for over 70 years and evaded 
multiple state attempts at eviction, these two neighbouring communities have achieved 
relative success in preserving their livelihoods amidst state attempts to rid the city of 
informal settlements, having incrementally upgraded their houses from straw huts to 
concrete buildings and gained access to basic urban services such as water, sanitation, 
and electricity. Their relative longevity and success also marks them as prime sites for 
understanding the multiple strategies of state engagement used by the urban poor to 
resist eviction and access urban citizenship.  
 
1) Informal-Antagonistic strategies  
 Informal-antagonistic strategies of engagement represent the most overt of 
strategies used by the urban poor to engage the state, often in the face of sudden state 
eviction attempts. These strategies are used when other material and/or symbolic 
resources are unavailable, thus often being the primary strategy used by newly formed 
settlements. Having newly occupied land with nothing but their huts, and bereft of 
cement houses or electrical and water connections that act to signify rightful occupancy, 
new inhabitants of informal settlements are especially vulnerable to threats of eviction. 
A lack of alternatives means that protests and mass agitations often serve as the only 
available resistance strategy.  
 Older residents recounted the early days in both communities as characterized 
by constant efforts to resist multiple eviction attempts. The use of protests and mass 
agitations featured heavily - the early residents of Anjenayar Nagar in particular, 
remembered with considerable detail and excitement how their then leader and 
                                                        
3 The names of the settlements Anjenayar Nagar and Service Colony, as well as 
the names of their residents are alibis. The real names of the settlements and 
residents have not been used to protect informants’ identities.  
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organizer Eesan had mobilized them for multiple protests and hunger strikes. Over time, 
however, protests were replaced by other less overt and antagonistic methods of state 
engagement.  
 This did not mean that use of protests and other antagonistic forms of state 
engagement had completely evaporated. The residents of Service Colony had resorted to 
protests on several occasions in order to force the state to restore one of the non-
functioning public toilets in the community and to advance their case for the granting of 
pattas (land titles indicating legal ownership of land) aided by a local political activist 
from the Communist Party of India (Marxist). An interview with Ramu, a local political 
activist who had aided Eesan in early attempts to secure pattas for Anjenayar Nagar’s 
residents helped clarify the logic behind the use of protests as a state engagement 
strategy. Noting his affiliation to the Dravidian Munnezha Kazhagam (DMK), one of the 
two main political parties in Tamil Nadu, Subadevan had asked him what he would do if 
the state threatened imminent eviction to the community’s residents as it had done in 
the past.  Ramu reminisced back to when a similar threat had materialized a few years 
back while the DMK was in power, with the exchange below resulting: 
 
Ramu (R) if they do, but they won’t do. That time they said they would evict, we 
brought the RA 2… Subadevan: area surveyor? R ah yes, and had a meeting here 
only, at the temple at Anjaneyar Nagar, then we went to Sindarapet (?) to go and 
see the party leaders … But if they do threaten to take away, whoever is in the 
government, we will put aside our party affiliations and fight it. We will put a big 
protest at the beach. We have already talked about it. Some people have even 
told me that they are ready to give up their lives. I told them no need to think 
about it now. We will discuss if they do something like that.  
(Field Note, 04 January 2015) 
  
 In addition to clarifying his primary loyalty to the community, Ramu’s response 
clarified the use of protests as trumps to be used when other strategies of state 
engagement were not tenable and the threat of eviction imminent.  
 Ramu’s account also corresponds with recent accounts of state eviction attempts 
in Chennai. A few months after we completed our fieldwork, there were renewed state 
attempts at evicting informal settlements along the Marina Beach loop (Yamunan 2015).  
Residents of the fishing communities occupying this stretch of the beach responded with 
intensive protests that eventually thwarted the threat of eviction. The use of protests as 
a strategy however, was a marked move away from the usual methods of mapping and 
legal challenges that fishing communities across Chennai had deployed to engage the 
state in recent memory (Kumar et al. 2014).  
Subadevan and Ijlal Naqvi 
Forthcoming in International Development Planning Review 
 8 
 These accounts serve to demonstrate the essential characteristics of informal-
antagonistic state engagement strategies. Firstly, these are informal strategies of state 
engagement as they take place outside the parameters of legitimate practices as defined 
by the state. Secondly, they are antagonistic as they openly contest the state’s authority 
and the existing status quo. By choosing to protest, sit in, or go on a hunger strike, the 
urban poor are contesting the state’s view that they are illegally occupying land, and 
asserting their right to stay put. Finally, these are last resort options, used in the absence 
of other material or symbolic resources to mobilise. This makes the use of protests most 
viable when the urban poor initially occupy land, and when the threat of eviction is 
imminent.  
 
 
 2) Informal-Transactional Strategies 
 Our interview with Ramu in addition to elucidating the nature of the use of 
protests as a strategy of state engagement, also threw light on less overt strategies of 
informal state engagement. In particular, Ramu highlighted interactions with 
government bureaucrats and politicians as essential to seeking concessions for the 
community.  These state actors operate within a formal governance framework that is 
fissured and multi-faceted, often providing the opportunity for the employment of 
informal-transactional strategies such as party affiliation, bureaucratic infiltration, and 
negotiation with various state actors over the use of space.  
 Forming alliances with political parties in power in order to gain concessions 
with the state has been identified in various other contexts as significant in determining 
whom the urban poor select as their community leaders cum organizers (Jha et al. 2007, 
Das 2011). As the exchange with Ramu indicates, the formation of party affiliations 
serves an instrumental purpose. While their personal interests might well be served by 
belonging to a political party, party affiliates in informal settlements devote 
considerable time and energy to using their political connections to serve the interests 
of the members of the community that they belong to. Ramu elaborated:  
  
 Why I joined means I wanted to do good for the people, water problem, 
 getting patta, so if I go as one person, I would not be able to get anything 
 done, but if I am in the party, I can call the vattach seyallalar 
 [Tehsildar/Revenue Collector] and tell and they will do, they will tell the 
 Maavata Seyallalar [District Collector] to do something, so that is why I joined. 
 
(Field Note, 04 January 2015) 
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 Ramu’s explanation for his decision to join a political party was also corroborated by 
several community leaders and organizers in Service Colony who had come together to 
attempt to hold local elections for the next batch of local community leaders and 
organisers despite hailing from different political parties. ‘Politics second, friendships 
first’ (Field Note, 14 July 2014), said Sundaram, one of the organisers of the local 
elections, emphasising the primacy of personal relationships.  
 These community leaders and organisers also took to infiltrating the many levels 
of state bureaucracy in addition to seeking affiliation with political parties, using tactics 
that resemble what Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari (2006: 222) term the ‘politics of 
stealth’ used to infiltrate the ‘porous bureaucracy’. Lower and middle level 
bureaucracies provide opportunities for community leaders and organizers in these 
informal settlements to gain concessions from the state by interacting and negotiating 
with state bureaucrats. Community leaders and organizers often approach various 
governmental departments and parastatal bodies in an attempt to seek concessions 
from various alternative sources of state authority by exploiting fissures in the state 
apparatus. The use of this strategy of bureaucratic infiltration also serves to exploit the 
arbitrariness of bureaucratic action, a by-product of the institutional weaknesses and 
overtly complex procedures that characterize bureaucracy in India and much of the rest 
of the global south (Gupta 2012).  
 The apparent arbitrariness of bureaucratic action, however, hides a 
transactional logic that is hidden from those who do not frequent bureaucracies. 
Residents of informal settlements, while cognizant of the need to engage with 
bureaucrats in order to gain concessions or attempt to claim the status of rightful 
citizen, spoke of bureaucratic procedures in abstract terms, such as the filing of a 
petition or the writing of a letter. Locally appointed community representatives/leaders 
were the ones tasked with the responsibility of deriving the appropriate methods by 
which concessions could be gained from bureaucrats in lower and middle level 
bureaucracies. This required these community representatives to actively attempt to 
understand the nature of informal bureaucratic practices and form close relationships 
with government bureaucrats so that they might possibly grant them concessions from 
undertaking onerous bureaucratic procedures in the future. The forming of these 
relationships is difficult, requiring sustained effort on account of the negative 
perceptions generally held by bureaucrats towards the urban poor (Coelho 2005, Anand 
2012).  
 The importance of these relationships was evidenced in Vikram’s visit to the 
Tehsildar’s (Revenue Inspector) office. Vikram, a 22-year old resident of Anjenayar 
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Nagar, sought to go to the office in order to secure an income certificate that would aid 
his brother’s scholarship application by showing proof of familial financial difficulty and 
allowed Subadevan to accompany him on his visit. While local bureaucratic procedures 
can be bewildering. Vikram seemed well equipped to navigate bureaucratic channels on 
account of his relatively high level of education, at that time pursuing a master’s degree 
in Criminology.  
 Yet, Vikram’s sense of frustration and confusion soon became apparent. First, 
Vikram was almost immediately derailed from his mission, being told that he needed to 
book another appointment and bring along a missing required document. Luckily, 
Vikram was able to secure a concession to proceed with the application.  What followed, 
however, was an incredibly frustrating process of trying to locate the Revenue Inspector 
(the RI2), involving visits to multiple offices based on contradictory information 
provided by various bureaucrats. Eventually he found out that she would not be present 
during visitation hours from a non-descript note stuck outside the office. Frustrated, 
Vikram muttered ‘you go here, they will say go there, you go there, they say you come 
here’. Subadevan enquired ‘no system?’, to which Vikram gave an ironic laugh and 
replied ‘no, that is bureaucracy here’ (Field Note, 26 December 2014).  
 Vikram’s visit to the Tehsildar office highlights the important role played by local 
community leaders and representatives in addressing the various issues faced by the 
residents of informal settlements by understanding bureaucratic procedures and 
forming relationships with lower and middle level government bureaucrats. Vikram’s 
relatively high level of education was not helpful in enabling him to decode informal 
bureaucratic procedures and secure accurate information from his interactions with 
bureaucrats. What was required was a different type of knowledge – an intimate 
understanding of bureaucratic procedures, something Vikram did not possess.  
 ‘No, not educated, but he had this’ (Field Note, 19 December 2014), said 
Rajendran, pointing to his head, when asked whether Anjenyar Nagar’s former leader 
Eesan benefitted from being well educated in advancing Anjenayar Nagar’s residents 
attempts to secure basic services and land ownership. The ‘this’ Rajendran referred to 
can be understood as being streetwise in the sense of having an intimate knowledge of 
various bureaucracies, their procedures, and the relevant actors to approach within 
these organisations. The importance of having streetwise community leaders and 
organisers is reflected in Service Colony’s attempts to rejuvenate local community 
leadership with younger men who would have the time and energy to traverse various 
government bureaucracies, form relationships with bureaucrats, and decode various 
bureaucratic practices.  
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 Informal-transactional strategies thus have three main characteristics. Firstly, 
they require the use of informal procedures to circumvent or access formal 
requirements by affiliating and negotiating with state actors such as politicians and 
government bureaucrats. These are informal actions as the channels through which 
such affiliations and negotiations take place occur outside of bureaucratic logics defined 
by law and policy as the proper means by which to engage state institutions and 
representatives. Secondly, they are transactional rather than antagonistic. Community 
representatives do not attempt to challenge their community’s status as non-citizens 
under the rubric of urban citizenship. Instead, they attempt to gain concessions for their 
communities from lower and middle level bureaucrats and politicians. Transactional 
strategies of engagement also result in gains for these bureaucrats and politicians. These 
strategies are transactional as the extension of concessions allows bureaucrats and 
politicians to maintain the existing status quo without dealing with protests and other 
antagonistic confrontations that may be initiated by the urban poor. Politicians further 
gain by securing electoral support for elections.  Lastly, these forms of state engagement 
are pursued when the threat of eviction is not imminent; often some time after the 
occupancy of an informal settlement is established as this long-drawn strategy to gain 
concessions through building alliances requires community leaders/representatives to 
invest significant amounts of time and energy.  
 
 3) Formal-Antagonistic Strategies 
 Formal-antagonistic forms of state engagement are defined by two main 
characteristics. Firstly, they are formal as they utilize practices of state engagement 
recognized by the state as being legitimate. Secondly, they are antagonistic as they seek 
to challenge the existing status quo. By using these strategies of state engagement, the 
urban poor seek to contest their status as non-citizens under the existing rubric of 
urban citizenship. We term such strategies as attempts at formalising the informal.  
 The installation of utilities such as water connections in particular, serves the 
purpose of formalising the informal by generating utility charges. The generation of 
these utility charges forces the state to recognize residents of informal settlements as 
formal paying customers of the state and long-term occupiers of the land. These charges 
can be used in the long run to establish de-facto tenure and a claim to ownership based 
on extended occupation of land. Employing informal-transactional strategies to engage 
with the state and its actors, local community leaders of these slum communities are 
able to influence the state to extend the delivery of basic services such as water 
connections that slum residents have no legal right to. The extension of these utilities 
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then generates utility charges which serve to document a formal relationship with the 
state. A letter dated to 1987 collectively addressed to the Prime Minister by local 
community leaders from Service Colony, Anjenayar Nagar, and other informal 
settlements nearby characterises the importance of the establishing of these utility 
connections:  
 
  We, the undersigned 20 subjects of our esteemed country have been living 
 since 1932 in the piece of land having survey No. R.S. 971/1 we have been 
 paying house tax, land tax etc. till 1970. Our petition to District Collector was 
 considered and boundary was laid. Besides basic facilities were also  provided. 
(Letter, January 03, 1987)  
  
The extract above shows how the establishment of basic utilities (facilities) is used as an 
indicator of long-term and rightful occupancy of land. 
 More significantly, the establishment of these basic utilities provides leverage 
for the urban poor to contest the state for formal recognition of land occupancy. This 
same formal relationship through the generation of utility charges had been used to 
engage the state differently in both Anjenayar Nagar and Service Colony. Eesan, the 
deceased former leader of Anjenayar Nagar had taken to encouraging residents to settle 
utility charges promptly, even going to the extent of drafting a makeshift water 
consumption sheet for Anjenayar Nagar’s residents to track how much water they had 
consumed monthly. In Service Colony, however, local community representatives 
encouraged their residents to leave water utility charges unpaid. Cognisant of the 
potential negative publicity for municipal officials from cutting off the supply of utilities 
to disenfranchised groups on grounds of their inability to pay, local leaders were 
adamant that residents of the community would only pay outstanding utility charges if 
they were granted land tenure. 
 Local community leaders of these two communities also took to using the formal 
bureaucratic channels to coerce the state into recognizing their long-term and rightful 
ownership of land. For instance, twenty years ago Eesan had filed a stay order against 
continued attempts by the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB) to evict 
Anjenayar Nagar’s residents. While this did not in itself grant them land tenure, current 
residents of Anjenayar Nagar could not be summarily evicted as the TNSCB had to wait 
for a resolution to the case.  
 Thus, formal-antagonistic forms of state engagement are defined by their use of 
formal procedures to challenge existing classifications of urban citizenship. By 
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generating utility charges, communities force the state to engage with them on the basis 
of their status as consumers of services provided by the state. In providing utilities, the 
state has entered into a formal relationship with the residents of informal settlements – 
that of service provider and consumer – as a result of past bargaining and pressure. This 
status is then used by residents to negotiate with the state through this formalised 
procedure. Similarly, the filing of a stay order in the courses also forces the state to enter 
a formal relationship with such settlements through the form of a legal challenge. Both 
examples are also antagonistic, for they are designed to challenge the state’s existing 
classification of slum residents as illegal occupiers of land. A degree of judicial 
independence from social and political structures is an important enabler of these 
strategies. 
 
 4) Formal-Transactional Strategies 
 Formal-transactional strategies refer to the last category of strategic methods 
used by the urban poor to engage with the state and its actors. These forms of 
engagement are formal as they use methods of engagement viewed by the state as being 
legitimate. Secondly, they are transactional as the actions within are collaborative and 
do not aggressively disrupt the existing status quo. These forms of state engagement are 
characterised by actions that use accepted forms of organizations, such as RWAs and 
NGOs as platforms to engage with the state through recognized procedures. When used 
by the urban poor, these forms of engagement mimic civil society. This strategy of 
mimicking civil society entails the use of symbolic markers by local community 
organizations in informal settlements to denote legitimacy and public authority on par 
with civil society organizations and the state (Lund 2006). This strategy had been used 
to considerable success in Anjenayar Nagar over the last two decades and was being 
tried out in Service Colony. 
 Eesan had undertaken efforts in the 1960s itself to form a local community 
organization. Named the Tamil Nadu Scheduled Caste Sangam, it was a registered 
society, thus giving this informal mode of local organization an air of formality. More 
significantly, however, it had its own seal that was affixed to correspondences sent to 
state departments and their officials. The formulation and employment of this seal is 
symbolically significant, enabling the local community organization to claim legitimacy 
and authority equal to civil society organizations and state entities.  
 From Eesan’s personal archive we learnt that local community organizations in 
other adjacent slum communities had resorted to employing such symbolic practices, 
each possessing their own seal and adopting other symbolic markers of legitimacy and 
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authority. For instance, the signatory to the letter to the Prime Minister described above 
– a local community leader – marked under his name that he was the president of the 
local community organization. Rather than indicating any recognized authority, this title 
was a symbolic indicator of the formal status to which the organization aspired.  
 This strategy of mimicking civil society echoes the findings of Coelho and Venkat 
(2009) in their study of Chennai’s RWAs, a typically middle class form of association 
belonging to civil society. Finding that the urban poor had taken to appropriating 
typically middle class forms of association and organization and that the urban middle 
class were tied much more closely to formal politics than contemporary accounts would 
suggest, Coelho and Venkat conclude that there are significant overlaps between 
Chatterjee’s civil and political society, with the analytical distinctions between both 
largely overplayed.  
 Chatterjee, however, is careful to clarify that organizations operating in political 
society are not akin to civil society organizations although they might seem outwardly 
similar. Chatterjee documents how Anadi Bera, the chief organizer of the slum 
community he uses as case study to illustrate the concept of political society, 
successfully formed a People’s Welfare Organization (PWO) similar in character to an 
RWA. For Chatterjee, institutions such as Bera’s PWO differ from civil society 
organizations due to the different contexts they operate from. Organizations such as 
Bera’s PWO operate from a more precarious site of negotiation and contestation on 
account of having originated from ‘a collective violation of property laws and civic 
regulations’  (p. 59). These organizations thus seek to mimic civil societal forms of 
organization and activism in order to evoke a sense of legitimacy and authority on par 
with that granted to civil society organizations by the state.  
 Local community leaders and organizers also took to a separate practice that 
denotes the second form of formal-transactional strategies – that of using formal 
bureaucratic channels to engage with the state and its actors. Thus, for instance, local 
community leaders and organizers would send registered mails to all possible relevant 
departments when attempting to pursue a course of action in the interests of the 
community. The use of registered mail ensured that these local community leaders 
would get acknowledgement of the receipt of these letters by the relevant bureaucrats, 
creating a repository of previous actions undertaken to engage various state actors and 
ensure that courses of action sought by the community were being furthered through 
the proper bureaucratic channels. The use of this strategy in particular, often served as a 
complement to informal means of engaging state bureaucrats.  
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 Our analyses of formal-transactional strategies thus reveal two main 
characteristics. Firstly, they seek to either evoke a sense of legitimacy on par with the 
state and civil society organizations and/or use formal bureaucratic channels to engage 
with the state and its actors. Secondly, these forms of state engagement are 
transactional, seeking to evoke the notion of co-operation and collaboration instead of 
openly challenging the state.  
 
Integrating the literature 
 Having used ethnographic evidence to outline the framework by which we use to 
analyse the various forms of state engagement used by the urban poor, we now attempt 
to integrate existing accounts of state engagement from prior scholarship into our 
framework. In doing so, we also decode an approximate temporal logic to the strategies 
deployed in our field sites, evolving as they transitioned from the precariousness of 
early existence in political society to a relatively more stable existence where they 
attempt to cross over to the realm of civil society.  
 Protests are the most overt and visible strategy of state engagement practiced by 
the urban poor (Harriss 2006) The use of protests, hunger strikes and other forms of 
mass agitations falls into the first category of informal-antagonistic methods of state 
engagement. Often being options of the last resort, this method of engagement is 
deployed when a community first tries to establish itself, lacking other symbolic or 
material resources to deploy. This method of state engagement also manifests when 
sudden threats of eviction arise and urgent action is necessary to stymie these eviction 
threats. The use of protests and other antagonistic methods of state engagement, 
however, is less favoured when a community becomes more established – meaning it 
has secured a foothold in the area that it occupied, built up a more permanent presence, 
and is less vulnerable to the risk of eviction. Protests and other antagonistic actions can 
again be activated when a sudden threat of eviction manifests, albeit at the cost of 
destroying relationships with government bureaucrats that had been built up 
incrementally over time.  
  Instead, informal-transactional strategies of state engagement are preferred to 
gain concessions from political actors and lower and middle level bureaucrats within 
state institutions. Benjamin’s (2008) concept of ‘occupancy urbanism’, Bayat’s (1997b) 
concept of ‘the quiet encroachment of the ordinary’, Rao’s (2013) account of ‘tolerated 
encroachment’, and Das’s (2011) and Jha, Rao, and Woolcock’s (2007) accounts of the 
forming of political affiliations by residents of informal settlements demonstrate the 
importance of negotiating the fissures in the state through local political and lower and 
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middle level bureaucratic channels. Here, the urban poor are not challenging their status 
as non-citizens but attempting to get concessions from the state and its actors.  
 While such informal alliances and negotiations are useful for gaining 
concessions, the urban poor do not rely on them throughout. Depending on informal 
alliances and negotiations is precarious. While useful for getting periodic concessions 
from the state, threats of eviction might suddenly arise. The urban poor seek to 
challenge for urban citizenship by using formal-antagonistic forms of state engagement. 
Such challenges can take various forms. For instance, Appadurai (2001) shows how the 
urban poor can conduct of their own enumeration surveys that challenge the state’s 
classifications. Similarly, Kumar et al. (2014) document how urban fisherman groups 
have been able to conduct their own mapping exercises to challenge their illegal status 
by constructing their own land use maps. In this example, the urban poor go a step 
further, using these maps as the basis for mounting legal challenges in the courts. 
Ranganthan’s (2014b) account of paying for pipes on Bangalore’s urban peripheries, 
while focused on the urban lower middle class, shows how securing service delivery 
allows urban residents to engage the state through a service provider-consumer 
relationship. As our ethnography demonstrates, the urban poor can utilize these 
methods to attempt to gain legal recognition from the state. The use of procedures 
deemed legitimate by the state to challenge existing classifications is the defining 
character of forms of engagement in this category.  
 These strategies of state engagement are formal as they use practices that 
confirm to existing bureaucratic logics and/or are visually/spatially legitimate in the 
eyes of the state. The filing of court cases is an engagement process deemed formal 
according to law and policy. The use of other forms of knowledge production such as 
mapping or the conduct of surveys conforms to existing logics of knowledge production 
used by the state. These are also antagonistic strategies of engagement as they seek to 
challenge the state’s conceptualization of those living in informal settlements as illegal 
occupiers of land. As McFarlane (2004) highlights, the deployment of such strategies 
‘can be analysed as forms of insurgent citizenship that seek to extend substantive 
citizenship to the urban poor’ (p. 896). The deployment of such strategies might not 
result in an actual change in the status of the urban poor as non-citizens. Importantly 
however, they challenge existing ‘imaginative geographies of the poor, and seek to 
create alternative imaginative geographies’ (McFarlane, 2004: 911). When the urban 
poor deploy such strategies, their status shifts in the eyes of the state. While their claims 
to urban citizenship are still contested, the formality of the response required is itself a 
form of recognition that the state is forced to extend.  
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 This shift in status allows the urban poor to deploy the last of a set of strategies – 
formal-transactional strategies. While formal-antagonistic strategies can be effective, 
they do not make for a good working relationship with the state and its representatives. 
Through formal transactional strategies, the urban poor mimic civil society by engaging 
the state through NGOs or by forming RWAs of their own. RWAs, while not equating to 
property ownership, carry the normative character of civil society organizations. 
Members use RWAs as platforms to frame their demands less as political demands than 
as rights based on the allotment of property (Coelho and Venkat). The nature of claims 
made by RWAs and urban groups affiliated to the urban poor evolve significantly over 
time. Initially seeking concessions from the state, they start using the language of rights 
to assert their claims to property and use symbolic procedures and markers, such as the 
filing of a petition or writing of letters – practices that conform to existing bureaucratic 
logics.  
 These strategies of state engagement are formal as their organizational 
structures and practices conform to existing bureaucratic logics and exhibit markers of 
visual and spatial legitimacy in the eyes of the state. They are transactional as such 
engagements with the state are couched in a collaborative rather than antagonistic tone, 
and geared towards forming establishing lasting relationships with the state and its 
representatives. The urban poor, through their mimicry of elites, deploy their 
accumulated resources and networks to further the claims on urban citizenship that 
they have previously pursued by challenging existing imaginative geographies of 
citizenship using formal-antagonistic methods.  
 The use of such strategies does not mean that the urban poor now possess 
substantive urban citizenship and belong to civil society, something that only the 
allocation of property ownership can accomplish. However, the urban poor are able to 
deploy such strategies of state engagement on account of having progressed along the 
spectrum of political society towards the category of civil society. Each move on the 
trajectory from informal-antagonistic strategies to formal-transactional strategies 
means that the urban poor reduce their precarity. Few informal settlements reach this 
stage. As Coelho and Venkat highlight, RWAs resembling civil society organizations 
constitute a minority of representational groups in informal settlements across Chennai. 
For those at this stage, however, the hope is that the politics of persuasion through the 
mimicry of civil society will eventually bestow upon them property ownership and mark 
their transition from civil to political society.  
 
Conclusion 
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 This article has articulated a typology by which to understand the nature of the 
strategies of engagement utilized by the urban poor in the global south to engage with 
the state.  Each of the four categories in this typology distinguish the key characteristics 
of multiple forms of state engagement undertaken by the urban poor. We integrate 
existing accounts of state engagement and show how they are not mutually exclusive, 
but instead, complementary, forming part of a strategic calculus of actions undertaken 
by the urban poor to engage the state at multiple levels and varying contexts in 
incremental advances towards urban citizenship.  
 We demonstrate, using our case, the deployment of strategies according to 
temporality and resource availability. In our field sites, informal-antagonistic forms of 
state engagement proved unpopular as the settlements slowly established themselves, 
threatening the ties built with bureaucrats and local politicians by community leaders. 
These strategies only manifest again in desperate scenarios indicating sudden imminent 
eviction. Beyond this, we also demonstrate how strategies of state engagement had 
evolved over time in our field-sites. This does not mean that this temporal logic is 
universal. This approximate temporal logic is based on the exploration of an Indian case 
that might be applicable to other contexts with some level of democratic responsiveness 
and accountability - even if democracy in such contexts might be imperfect (Heller and 
Evans 2010) or disjunctive (Caldeira and Holston 1999). Attempting to claim urban 
citizenship in the context of a repressive regime is unlikely to work. As Bayat (1997a) 
argues, actions taken by squatters in non-democratic regimes are likely to be limited to 
silent encroachment. In such contexts, an open challenge for urban citizenship cannot 
manifest. The logic of strategy deployment will also vary based on other contextual 
factors – see the alarming frequency of service delivery protests in South Africa (Allan 
and Heese 2011), or the de jure rights to the city in Brazil (Fernandes 2007) – which 
cannot be covered fully here. However, this framework provides a basis for analysis that 
is applicable to most contexts possessing some democratic character.   
 We intend for this typology to allow for more meaningful analyses of strategies 
of state engagement used by urban poor groups in the global south. We do not intend to 
brand informality as the domain of the urban poor alone. Urban elites and the state 
often circumvent existing regulations to pursue their own ends, and the urban poor 
sometimes use formal procedures and applications to engage the state. Yet, we argue 
that in the Indian case, the tools and resources available to the urban poor lie largely in 
the informal sphere, with the urban poor having to draw initially on informal strategies 
of state engagement before accessing formal strategies of state engagement. 
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Figure 1. A Schematic Representation of Patterns of State Engagement 
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